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JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Second Judicial District Court was entered on September 20,
1993.

Record ("Ft.") 1629-30. The notice of appeal was filed October 15, 1993. R.

1634-35.

A timely cross appeal was filed by General Biometrics, Inc. ("GenBio") on

October 28, 1993. R. 1639-40. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(k) (1993).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Despite setting out five separate issues, Appellants raise only three essential
disputes: Was a contract formed? If so, was it authorized by the corporate defendant? If
not, are the trial court's findings fatally inconsistent? These three issues, with crossreferences to Appellants' original statement, are set out below.

The fourth and fifth

questions are raised by the Cross Appeal.
1.

Did the trial court err in determining that there was no contract of sale
between GenBio and Appellants? Compare Issue 5, App. Br. 2-3.

As Appellants well know (R. 587-88), contract formation does not present
"[qluestions of law" reviewed "without any special deference to the trial court." App. Br.
2. Rather, whether "the writings relied on by [Appellants] '. . . amount to the agreement
needed to give to [Appellants] the property interest claimed'" is a question of fact that may
not be set aside unless against "the great weight of the evidence." Southland Corp. v.
Potter. 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah App. 1988). 1
2.

Did the trial court err in finding that the purchase proposed by Appellants was
not authorized by GenBio in that it was neither (a) a cash offer approved by
the corporation's board of directors nor (b) within the apparent authority of
Defendant Thomas Gephart? Compare Issues 2, 3, 4, App. Br. 1-2.

Appellants concede that whether they proffered a "cash" offer is a deferentially
reviewed issue of fact. App. Br. 1-2. They nevertheless assert that the parallel issue of

R. 587-88 (trial court memorandum drafted by Appellants) (citing O'Hara v. Hall. 628 P.2d 1289,
1291 (Utah 1981 J). Accord Wade v. Stanol, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994); Hall v. Process Instruments &
Control. Inc.. 866 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App. 1993); West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,
1313 (Utah App. 1991); Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v. Corbett. 793 P.2d
356,358 (Utah 1990).

t

apparent authority is reviewable for mere error. jj£. at 2. It is not.

w

[A]n agent's apparent

or ostensible authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the principal." Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090# 1095 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, because
any apparent authority of Gephart rests upon the trial court's assessment of the "acts" and
"conduct" of GenBio ( j d j , the issue - like other questions of contract formation - is
reviewable only for clear error.2
3.

Do purportedly inconsistent findings regarding Thomas Gephart's control of
GenBio require a remand when the ultimate judgment of the trial court can be
sustained notwithstanding the asserted inconsistency, Appellants inculcated
any inconsistency, and the claimed inconsistency - in any event - is
reconcilable? Compare Issue 1, App. Br. 1.

This issue does not neatly fit into a "law/fact" dichotomy:
Although the universe of questions presented for review has often been
characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact or law,
there is really a third category - the application of law to fact or, stated more
fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach
of a given rule of law.
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Whether the trial court's findings are
sufficient to support its judgment falls within this "third category." kL. But, even though
it is a mixed question of law and fact, this issue does not demand close scrutiny. While
"complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact . . . [are] essential to the resolution of
dispute under the proper rule of law" (Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979)), it is nevertheless true that, "as a general rule, a reviewing court indulges every
reasonable presumption in favor" of sustaining the trial court's judgment. Paul v. Kunz.
524 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Ind. App. 2d Dist. 1988). Accordingly, in addressing this issue,
the Court should accord the trial court "a measure of discretion" and not engage in "close,
de novo review." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d at 939.

2

Services Holding Co., Inc. v. TransAmerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 1994 WESTLAW 32139 (Az.
App. Div. 1 February 8, 1994) ("the issue of whether [the agent! had apparent authority to bind [the principal]
is a factual question"); Montova v. Grease Monkey Holding Corp., 1994 WESTLAW 8663 (Colo. App. March
10, 1994) ("Whether such apparent authority existed is a question of fact, and the trial court's determination
of this issue is binding if supported by sufficient competent evidence") (citing Heatherridoe Management Co.
v. Bension. 558 P.2d 435 (Colo. 1976)). See also authority at Note 3, above.

2

4.

Do former directors of a corporation who, while serving on the corporate
board, made extensive plans to acquire valuable corporate assets without full
disclosure of their intentions escape liability for breach of fiduciary duty
merely because their planned acquisition was ultimately unsuccessful?

This question is also a mixed issue of law and fact. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 93536. However, because the law governing breach of fiduciary duties by corporate directors
is well-established and exacting, 3 GenBio submits that "whether a specific set of facts
gives rise to [breach of fiduciary duty] . . . is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness,
as opposed to being [predominantly] a fact determination reviewable for clear error." \sL,
at 939.

This intermediate standard lies somewhere between the deferential review

accorded facts and the correction of error standard applied to questions of law. \JL at 939
& note 4.
5.

Should Appellants be sanctioned under Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P., for filing
a frivolous appeal?

Rule 33 issues are considered in the first instance by this Court. E.g., Schonev v.
Memorial Estates. Inc.. 863 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1993).
STATUTES AND RULES

Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P., provides in pertinent part:
Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that
a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs,
as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.
The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a case of corporate intrigue. While the storyline is not nearly as engaging as
the standard pulp novel, it nevertheless contains all the elements of a legal potboiler:
conspiracy, secrecy, deception and sheer effrontery in the use of judicial process. And,

3

E.g.. Pond v. Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1994); Nicholson
v. Evans, 642 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); filgQ
Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 296 P. 231 (Utah 1931): Elogren v. Woollev, 228 P. 906 (1924);
Resolution Trust Coro. v. Hess. 820 F. Supp 1359 (D. Utah 1993).

3

although the district court properly denied the conspirators the ending they desired, it
added an ironic denouement of its own to the tale: the court concluded that, because the
corporation ultimately foiled the raid attempted by its former directors, the marauders were
not accountable for the injuries caused by their misdeeds.
The Appellants protest that the district court saw through their plot. GenBio is
concerned that the lower court improperly refused to punish them for writing it.
A*

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition bv Trial Court

On November 12, 1991, Robert A. Condie ("Condie") and James Yarter ("Yarter"),
former executive officers of GenBio, brought suit along with C&Y Corp. ("C&Y"), a shell
corporation owned by Condie and Yarter, to compel GenBio to convey to them the only
profitable assets held by GenBio. R. 1-47. The action was filed following the termination
of an earlier federal court action, brought by C&Y, which was dismissed for failure to join
indispensable parties (i.e.. Condie and Yarter). No. 91-C-483A (D. Utah, filed May 7,
1991).

In their state-court action, Condie and Yarter asserted that a half-page letter

proposing to purchase corporate assets bound GenBio to the sale.

App. Br. Exh. A.

GenBio denied that the letter constituted a binding contract and counterclaimed that
Condie's and Yarter's purchase scheme - conceived, in secret, while serving as GenBio
corporate officers - violated their fiduciary obligations. R. 54-70.
Following the presentation of Appellant's case-in-chief, the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County, Judge Jon Memmott presiding, granted GenBio's dismissal motion
under Rule 4Kb), Utah R. Civ. P., "because after completing the presentation of their
evidence plaintiffs have shown no right to relief based upon the facts and the law." R.
1589. According to the court, "there's nowhere any evidence presented that there was
an agreement." June 10 Tr. 4 1 . Accord R. 1585-1592.
Thereafter, following the presentation of GenBio's evidence on its counterclaim, the
court granted Condie's and Yarter's Rule 4Kb) motion. The court concluded that, even
though Condie and Yarter had unquestionably conceived their purchase plans while serving

4

as corporate directors (June 10 Tr. 49) and admittedly kept those plans secret,4 the former
directors were not in breach because the purchase was unsuccessful and "so there really
was no breach of corporate opportunity or breach of fiduciary duty." June 10 Tr. 54.
IL

Background

With only one citation to the transcript (App. Br. 7) (gt Rule 24(a)(7), Utah R. App.
P.), Appellants paint a decidedly sketchy (and distorted) Statement of Facts, idk at 4-9.
The issues they raise, however, cannot be reviewed without a full and careful marshaling
of the evidence. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc., 236 Utah Adv.
Rep. 24, 26 (Utah App. 1994).

Because Appellants have completely abdicated this

responsibility, GenBio has been "constrained to do the appellants'] work . . .

at

considerable time and expense." i i .
The following Statement is lengthy.

The nature of the issues presented by

Appellants, however, necessitates this detail. See standard of review authority cited at 13, above. This Statement will set forth GenBio's business and products, board discussions
regarding the possible sale of certain assets, Condie's and Yarter's plans to purchase those
assets, their resulting purchase offer, and the negotiations surrounding the unsuccessful
drafting of a purchase agreement.
1.

GenBio and its products

GenBio was created in 1987 with the merger of two medical research companies:
DataGene, Inc. and Microbiological Research Corporation ("MRC"). Since its inception, the
operations of the merged entity have been funded in large measure by stock purchases and
loans made by Ventana Growth Fund ("Ventana"). R. 1586-88. Contrary to Appellants'
brief, however, Ventana — as well as its managing partners Duwaine Townsen ("Townsen")
and Thomas Gephart ("Gephart") - do not control "a super-majority of the stock of
GenBio." App. Br. 4; i i . a t 18. Indeed, Appellants stipulated (June 7 Tr. 52) and the trial
court found (R. 1586-87) that "all Ventana entities combined own less than twenty four

4

June 2 Tr. 126-27, 167, 170-71 (Yarter); June 3 Tr. 194-96 (Condie).

5

percent (24%) of GenBio's stock." R. 1587. 6
GenBio researches, develops and markets "innovative immunological and genetic
tests to screen or diagnose certain infectious diseases and to screen or predict genetic
conditions or disorders."6 The immuno-diagnostics division of GenBio has three main
product lines: immunofluorescent antibody ("IFA") tests, Immunodot diagnostic tests, and
Inheritel genetic profiling products.7 At the time of the merger of Datagene and MRC, the
bulk of GenBio's research and administrative functions were moved to La Jolla, California.8
The IFA technology, however, as well as the manufacture of reagents for the Immunodot
tests, remained at the MRC facility in Bountiful, Utah.9
In 1987, the development of Immunodot - considered the cutting edge of new
technology - was the primary focus of GenBio's efforts.10 GenBio's Inheritel products,
although having "tremendous intuitive appeal," were the "least developed product within"
the company.11
mature

business

The IFA technology at the MRC facility, in turn, was considered "a
operating in a relatively

small

marketplace."12

Accordingly,

"development of the Immunodot series of products" was "the highest priority" within
GenBio.13

Appellants stipulated that Ventana Growth Fund I owns 11.7% of GenBio's preferred stock, while
Ventana Growth Fund II owns 11.8% of that stock. June 7 Tr. 52. Ventana I and ll are separate legal
entities, and only Ventana Growth Fund I is a party to this litigation. JcL at 59-60. Any warrants held by
Ventana as a result of loans to GenBio do not affect corporate ownership because "[t]he warrants were not
converted into stock." R. 1587.
6

D. Exh. 60 (Executive Summary) at 1.

7

kL. (Business Consolidation Plan) at 1-2. "Immunodot" and "Inheritel" are business trademarks owned
by GenBio. J&.
8

Jd, at 3.

9

i ^ at 4.

10

id^ at 2-3.

11

Jiat3.

12

id^atl.

13

i i at 2.
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But, while Immunodot products may have been perceived to be critical to GenBio's
future, the IFA technology was unquestionably crucial to the company's present. At the
time of GenBio's formation, the IFA technology at the MRC facility in Bountiful was the
only money-making aspect of the company.

Indeed, the IFA facility had generated a

"relatively stable" volume of business "in the $600,000 range for the past several
years."14 As James Gordy ("Gordy"), GenBio's chief operating officer in 1989 testified,
the IFA technology "was really the only viable part of General Biometrics." June 7 Tr. 19.
2.

Possible sale of IFA facility

Sometime in 1989, Gordy conceived a plan to sell the IFA facility to generate
operating capital for GenBio. June 7 Tr. 25. The issue was discussed at a special meeting
of the GenBio board of directors held November 30, 1989. The board minutes reflect that:
A discussion was had concerning the possibilities of selling the Company's
MRC division. It was the sense of the Board that Mr. Gordy should
investigate the possible sale of this division and should bring any potential
offers to the Board for further discussion and decision.
D. Exh. 53 (R. 1585).
Standing alone, the above minutes do not reflect board approval of a sale, but rather
the board's consent to investigation and discussion of a possible sale. See June 2 Tr. 19798 (Yarter testifies that you could "assume" that the board authorized the sale even though
the minutes "doesn't [sic, don't] say it"). Gordy, however, later asserted that the board
had, in fact, authorized the actual sale of the IFA facility.

14

June 7 Tr. 32-33. 15 But,

iiati.

15

At trial, Plaintiffs relied on an addendum to the November 30 minutes to support Gordy's claim that
the board authorized the sale of the IFA technology. However, that addendum, executed on March 22, 1990,
recites - not that a sale was pre-approved - but, rather, that Gordy would receive a commission should any
sale over $500,000 materialize. The addendum provided ID. Exh. 53, R. 1585):
RESOLVED, that, in the event of the sale of the Company's Utah division (MRC), John T.
Gordy will be remunerated for his efforts on the Company's behalf according to the following
schedule:
MRC is sold for less than $500,000; no remuneration.
MRC is sold for $500,000 or greater; Mr. Gordy receives five (5%) percent of the net
sale amount up to a maximum of Fifty Thousand ($50,000) Dollars.
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whatever the precise terms of his sales authority, one point is perfectly clear: Gordy
conceded that the GenBio board would have to approve any sale for one cent less than
$500,000 in cash. June 7 Tr. 44; R. 1586. 16
According to Appellants, GenBio "[f]or approximately the next year, aggressively
attempted to sell its MRC Division, but with no success."

App. Br. 6.

Appellants,

however, give no citation to evidence supporting their use of the adverb "aggressively."
The reason for that omission is plain. There is none. Yarter - who during the greater part
of that year was president of GenBio (June 2 Tr. 68) - testified that he knew of only two
attempts to sell the IFA facility. Jd^ at 187. 17

These non-aggressive sales efforts by

GenBio's president are readily understandable, however: Yarter had already decided to
purchase the facility for himself.
3.

Condie's and Yarter's purchase plans

When Gordy first proposed selling the IFA facility, GenBio's board of directors
consisted of Condie, Yarter, Gordy and Townsen (a Ventana managing partner). Within a
month of the November 1989 board meeting, Condie and Yarter - without informing
Townsen or Ventana ~ began discussions regarding the purchase of the IFA facility for their
own account. These discussions, contrary to the unsupported assertion of Appellants,
were hardly "in passing." App. Br. 6.

16

During direct examination by Appellants' counsel, Gordy testified (June 7 Tr. 44):
Q.

And to understand, what circumstances would you have had to have gone back to the
board to get board approval for the sale of MRC during that period of time?

A.

$499,000.99. [Sic; $499,999.99]

Accord June 7 Tr. 33 (Gordy testifies that, if offer was less than $500,000 cash, he would have "to go back
to the board and they would have to consider whether the offer was appropriate or not in terms of our
direction").
17

The trial court found that Gordy "regularly marketed" the sale of the IFA assets for six to eight
months. R. 1595. The only examples of these marketing efforts, however, were the same two contacts cited
by Yarter: a listing agreement with a broker and discussions with one possible buyer. R. 1596. While these
efforts - to use the trial court's term - may be "regular," they are hardly "aggressive." See also June 3 Tr.
92-98 (Condie unable to provide admissible evidence of any efforts to sell the IFA facility; court notes at page
97 "two or three examples . . . where testimony has indicated when you got into it that he [Condie] didn't
have personal knowledge and that people with personal knowledge should testify"); KL at 98 (Condie admits
having no personal knowledge about sales efforts).
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Condle and Yarter first discussed purchasing the business in December 1989.
Gordy, for example, testified that
at some point — I'm not positive — it was December, January-point, Mr. Yarter
even asked me if I would be interested in joining a group to buy MRC. And
I don't think I said yes and I don't think I said no. I just said I'll tell you it's
a good little company. But as you know, it's a maturing industry. But it's not
going to die off, you know, in the near future. I think it would be a really
good investment.
June 7 Tr. 39. Just how profitable an investment this "good little company" (jdj was
became clear in May 1990. By the spring of 1990, the IFA operation was making twice
what Gordy "had anticipated it would make." June 7 Tr. 130. 18 And, it was at this point
that Condie's and Yarter's efforts to purchase the Utah facility intensified.
On May 2, 1990, Condie and Yarter met to discuss their possible purchase. June
2 Tr. 155. At the time, both were corporate directors - and Yarter was chairman of the
board. iiL at 68. A letter, written by Condie to Yarter on May 3, confirms that - as a
result of their conversation - Condie "went out to the Gen-Bio office North Salt Lake and
talked to Bruce Ashton our manager at that facility." D. Exh. 12. The letter reported that
"[tjhere appears to be a great opportunity to increase the value of this opperation [sic] if
we proceed to purchase it."

IcL The letter also suggested how that value could be

increased: "A move to a single facility would offer great economy of operation and could
possibly be done for a reduced rental." IdL
As part of their discussions in early May, Condie and Yarter began negotiations to
obtain financing for their contemplated purchase. June 2 Tr. 132, 160-61. After receiving
Condie's May 3 letter, Yarter wrote to Condie enclosing a personal financial statement for
use in obtaining financing. \d±; D. Exh. 14. Yarter's note also informed Condie that Yarter
had asked corporate officials "to send you fi.e., Condie] the financial statements on MRC,"
and noted that "the purchase price would be between $500,000 - $1,000,000." D. Exh.
14.

18

D. Exh. 13 at 3 (May 8, 1990 memorandum from Gordy to GenBio board of directors ) ("The MRC
gross profit numbers . . . are particularly impressive because they have been the least affected by accounting
changes. They have nearly equaled or exceeded last year's total on a little over half the sales volume").
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Yarter had good reason to believe he would benefit at that price. He knew the
facility would generate between $300,000 and $500,000 in income annually. June 2 Tr.
162. He also knew that the sales price for a business is generally based on some multiple
of the company's annual earnings: he had earlier purchased another medical technology
business for 25 times its annual earnings. ]£L at 165. As a result, acquisition of the IFA
facility for between $500,000 and $1 million would be a bargain.
On May 24, 1990, Condie reported back to Yarter regarding the potential IFA
purchase:
I talked to Bruce Ashton [the manager of the MRC facility] today concerning
the Salt Lake IFA opportunity. He feels very positive about the potential of
increased sales. Gull Laboratories, a Salt Lake firm is in the same field we are
in. Three years ago their sales were approximately 1 million dollars. Their
1990 sales will be 4.2 million. Most of the increase comes from the European
market. There is no reason we cannot accomplish the same.
D. Exh. 15 (emphasis added).
The above note not only confirms why Condie and Yarter were interested in the "IFA
opportunity" (D. Exh. 15) - the facility could be purchased for around $500,000 (D. Exh.
14) and might generate as much as $4.2 million in income in a single year (D. Exh. 15) but also how Condie and Yarter set about acquiring that opportunity: in secret. The note
concludes with Condie's express assurance to Yarter that "I have not indicated our desire
to buy the North Salt Lake company with Bruce." D. Exh. 15. Indeed, secrecy was a
consistent hallmark of Condie's and Yarter's efforts from December 1989 through the
initiation of this litigation.
Yarter admitted that, throughout his consultations with various GenBio employees
and officers, he never told anyone - including Townsen, Gephart or Ventana -- that he was
personally interested in purchasing the IFA facility. June 2 Tr. 167, 170-72. Yarter failed
to make this disclosure even though he became chairman of the board in March 1990 and
president of GenBio in June 1990. June 2 Tr. 68. In fact, Yarter testified that, when
asked by GenBio's corporate secretary whether he was interested in purchasing the IFA
facility, he told her that it was "none of her business." June 2 Tr. 126-27.
Condie, for his part, admitted that he never informed GenBio or any of its officers or
10

employees of his desire to purchase the IFA facility - despite extended discussions with
GenBio employees regarding the operations and profitability of the facility. June 3 Tr. 19495; D. Exhs. 15f 22, 24, 26. Condie flatly asserted that, even after the decision in May
1990 to purchase the IFA facility, there was "no reason" to tell anyone at GenBio of his
and Yarter's plans. June 3 Tr. 194-95.
Those plans were on-going and extensive. Although Condie testified at trial that he
had only two or three discussions with Yarter regarding their proposed purchase (June 3
Tr. 194-95), he admitted in earlier deposition testimony that he and Yarter had
"considerable discussions about the potential of the company [the IFA facility]" and the
"opportunity to make money for the company."

June 3 Tr. 196.

Those discussions

included possible product expansion, the creation and collection of extensive financial data
regarding the IFA facility, and the exploration of cost-cutting measures.
In 1990, IFA technology was "mature."19 As a result, product expansion would
be necessary if the IFA facility were to remain profitable in the long run. Accordingly,
Condie testified the first issues explored by himself and Yarter was "research on new
products that we [could] bring into the company." June 3 Tr. 197.
In addition to possible product expansion, Condie and Yarter explored in detail the
financial viability of the IFA technology. Prior to the middle of 1990, the financial manager
of the IFA facility in Bountiful had had little or no contact with Condie. June 9 Tr. 145.
Beginning that summer, however, Condie began contacting her on a monthly basis to
request financial information. kL In July, for example, he requested data for the months
of April, May and June 1990. Jd. He later requested monthly statements for July and
August. isLat 154; D. Exhs. 22, 24, 26.
The information Condie sought did not focus on GenBio, but rather on the separate
income and expenses of the Utah facility.

June 9 Tr. 146.

Some of the requested

information, furthermore, was rather unusual. Condie requested (and received) a list of all
assets at the IFA facility with a cost of at least $2,000. I d at 147-48. This information

19

D. Exh. 60 (Business Consolidation Plan) at 1 .
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had never been compiled by — or provided to — anyone before. \JL at 149.

And, in

September of 1990, Condie requested "a letter from [GenBio's] auditor vouching that the
books at the Utah facility were correct based on just the Utah facility alone." \JL at 156.
This information, like the asset data, had never been sought before. isL
As with all aspects of Condie's and Yarter's dealings, the above data was generated
and gathered in secret. Condie never informed anyone at GenBio or the Utah facility why
he wanted the requested information.

June 9 Tr. 146, 149, 156.

The information,

furthermore, was not available for general consumption and was given to Condie only
"because he was on the board of directors."

IfiL at 151. Yarter, in fact, described

information similar to that gathered by Condie as "definitely confidential in nature." June
2 T r . 189.
In addition to exploring product expansion and the economic viability of the IFA
facility, Condie and Yarter examined possible means of increasing the facility's efficiency.
One of the initial cost-cutting measures suggested by Condie in May 1990 was a "move
to a single facility" to obtain "economy of operation and . . . a reduced rental." D. Exh. 12.
Condie and Yarter did their best to facilitate such a move prior to making their purchase
offer.
Condie instructed Bruce Ashton, manager of the IFA facility, to contact his son,
Steve Condie, if Ashton "needed to look at some lab space." June 3 Tr. 2 0 1 . Thereafter,
Steve Condie and Ashton undertook significant efforts to evaluate and obtain new
space.20

There is also little question but that these efforts were promoted and

orchestrated by Condie and Yarter. Although he testified that he didn't know what they
meant (June 2 Tr. 171), Yarter's handwritten notes show that, between May and October
1990, he sought information regarding the terms of the IFA facility's lease, how much

E.Q.. June 9 Tr. 151-54 (Steve Condie sought and obtained the IFA facility's leasing information
because he was attempting to find new space for the company); D. Exh. 27 (September 2 1 , 1990 memo from
Bruce Ashton re: "New Building vs. Remodeling;" memo states that Ashton has "looked at all the reasonable
buildings in the general area of Bountiful and have spoken to the owners or their representatives," and "[t]here
are two buildings that are in our price range and can be adapted to our use"); D. Exh. 28 (October 8, 1990
letter from Bruce Ashton) (letter states that GenBio "is interested in pursuing discussions about leasing the
building that we discussed on the west side of Highway 89").
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space IFA operations would need, how far the facility could move "without losing people,"
and "2-3 alternatives to present" leases. D. Exh. 23.
Yarter's handwritten notes also establish a "timetable" of October 1, 1990, as well
as a deadline for the proposed move: "Move before end of year."

\sL This year-end

deadline is telling. It was just prior to that deadline that Yarter and Condie (without
disclosing their identity as the actual offerors) made their first offer to purchase the IFA
facility.
4.

Condie's and Yarter's purchase offer

On November 29, 1990, Yarter submitted a letter of resignation as director and
chairman of the board of GenBio effective December 1, 1990. D. Exh. 3 1 . Later that
month, Condie and Yarter began negotiating their proposed purchase of the IFA facility.
On December 13, 1990, Condie made a written offer to Townsen. D. Exh. 33. The
letter stated that the "purchase price" would be $400,000, with $300,000 "cash - upon
closing" and $100,000 "90 days after closing." IdL This was the opening salvo in a round
of offers and counteroffers that, according to the trial court, never evidenced the "meeting
of the minds" necessary to contract formation. R. 1588.
Following his initial letter, Condie testified that Gephart telephoned him, informed him
that Gephart was now "in charge" of GenBio because Townsen was "burned out," and
that, at a "multiple of two or three times earnings," the IFA facility was worth between $1
to $2 million dollars. June 3 Tr. 100. Condie also claimed that Gephart asserted that
board approval of any sale "would be a perfunctory thing." id. at 101. In another phone
call around the third or fourth of January, Condie stated that he made a purchase offer that
Gephart rejected, but that Gephart then "made a counteroffer to me that I accepted." Id.
According to Condie, the terms of the accepted counteroffer were "$450,000 with
$350,00 cash, $100,000 in I believe 90 days."

\JL

Gephart's recollection is somewhat different. In his initial call to Condie following
the December 13 offer, Gephart testified that there was no specific discussion of price
because "I didn't know what would be a fair and reasonable price at that moment." June
9 Tr. 33. Gephart also denied telling Condie that board approval would be "perfunctory."
13

Id. Gephart further testified that the second phone call (initiated by Condie) occurred - not
in January - but around Christmas.

UL at 34-35.

According to Gephart, during the

conversation "Condie indicated that he would be sending me an outline what his thoughts
might be on the acquiring of [the IFA facility]." \sL at 36.
Whatever the course of the oral communications between Condie and Gephart, on
January 7, 1991 Condie sent Gephart the half-page letter upon which Appellants rest their
entire case. App. Br. 11-12, 23-24; App. Br. Exh. A. According to Condie, this letter
memorializes his earlier oral acceptance of Gephart's purported counteroffer. June 3 Tr.
102. 21 Unfortunately for Condie and Yarter, however, evident ambiguities in the letter
make it decidedly unclear just what was "accepted" on what terms.
According to Condie's sworn testimony, the "counteroffer" he orally "accepted" was
to purchase the IFA facility for "$450,000 with $350,00 cash, $100,000 in I believe 90
days." June 3 Tr. 101. 2 2 Condie's January 7 letter, however, provided for payment of
the last $100,000 in 75 to 120 - not 90 - days. App. Br. Exh. A ("75 [or 90, as
interlineated] days after closing $75,000;" "120 days after closing $25,000"). Moreover,
as originally drafted (before Condie's subsequent interlineations),23 the letter's price terms
were internally inconsistent: while setting out payment terms for $450,000 (App. Br. Exh.
A) - a sum consistent with Condie's supposed oral acceptance of Gephart's counteroffer
(June 3 Tr. 101) - the letter recited that the "purchase price" was $500,000.
In addition to the foregoing, the January 7 letter referred - not to a sale of "assets
and liabilities," the transaction continually discussed in the Appellants' brief (see, e.g., App.
Br. 24, 29, 30) - but rather to a purported "offer to sale [sic, sell] to us the assets of
MRC." App. Br. Exh. A (emphasis added). The letter, finally, demonstrated on its face that

21

According to Condie, "on the 7th of January I wrote Mr. Gephart a letter stating that I accepted his
offer and put the terms of the offer in writing." June 3 Tr. 102.
22

At another point in his testimony, Condie asserted that the accepted counteroffer required payment of
the $100,000 balance in "60 or 90 days." June 3 Tr. 103.
23

The interlineations on the copy produced for the Court were not on the original letter sent to Gephart.
According to Condie, the interlineated copy was his "copy and not the copy that was sent to Mr. Gephart
because these are my scratches and changes on it." June 3 Tr. 102.
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it did not represent a final, binding agreement: it concluded with the proviso that "[i]t is
necessary to have written acknowledgement of our agreement by Friday, January 11th,"
and provided that the final agreement would be memorialized in "a written contract of
purchase." Id.
Because of the obvious confusion generated by the January 7 letter, further oral
communications between Condie and Gephart were inevitable. According to Condie, he
called Gephart the day after he sent the January 7 letter, whereupon Gephart informed him
that "there was a mathematical error in the amount because it only I think totalled up to
$450,000." June 3 Tr. 103. Gephart, in turn, testified that Condie called to obtain the
written acknowledgement required by the January 7 letter.

June 9 Tr. 38.

Gephart,

however, merely told Condie that "I would try to get him some form of letter" because
"there's a general interest in discussing this matter." June 9 Tr. 38.
Following the above conversation, Gephart sent Condie a letter on January 10,
1991. App. Br. Exh. B. Although the letter recited that it was "written acknowledgement"
of an "agreement," the precise terms of that "agreement" were nowhere stated. Instead,
the letter specifically provided that, "[plursuant to your January 7 correspondence and to
our telephone conversation yesterday" (App. Br. Exh. B) (during which Gephart expressed
only "a general interest in discussing this matter" (June 9 Tr. 38, emphasis added)), nwe
generally agree with your proposal." App. Br. Exh. B. (emphasis added).
Gephart's January 10 letter, furthermore, altered the terms of Condie's "January 7
correspondence."

App. Br. Exh. B.

Gephart modified Section (B) of Condie's letter,

increasing it "to $400,000 - instead of $350,000 - so that the total will add up to the
entire $500,000." JiL. And, much more significantly, while Condie's January 7 letter had
proposed a sale of "assets" (App. Br. Exh. A), Gephart's acknowledgement described a
"sale of assets and liabilities." App. Br. Exh. B (emphasis added). Gephart's letter, finally,
added an express requirement of board approval: it specifically provided that Gephart would
"take this proposal to the GenBio Board of Directors within the next week, to receive formal
approval." idj.
Throughout the above negotiations, Condie and Yarter never informed Gephart or
15

GenBio that they were personally involved in the purchase. When he received Condie's
initial December 13, 1990 letter, Gephart was unaware that "Condie was the purchaser."
June 9 Tr. 30. Nor did Gephart know that the purchaser described in Condie's January 7
letter as "our group" (App. Br. Exh. A) included Condie. June 9 Tr. 37. Townsen, for his
part, did not know that Yarter was part of the "group" until the litigation was filed. June
9Tr. 123.
Condie, however, at least took one step during this period that furthered the interests
of GenBio. After sending his initial purchase offer on December 13, and during the ongoing negotiations with Gephart, he resigned from the board of directors effective
December 3 1 , 1990. D. Exh. 36.
5.

Purchase agreement negotiations

As contemplated by Condie's January 7 letter, the parties - with Condie and Yarter
acting through C&Y Corporation - began negotiating the terms of a purchase agreement
later that month. The process went badly.
The first draft of the agreement was cast as a stock purchase rather than an
acquisition of assets. June 4 Tr. 184. Indeed, the chief financial officer of GenBio was
"overwhelmed" when she first reviewed the draft because "whoever had prepared this
document didn't know what they were buying." kL at 242. The draft, among other
things, referred to the IFA facility as a separate corporation even though it was not a "real
corporate entity." Id.
The first draft also contained several items that remained disputed through the
second and (supposedly) final third versions of the agreement. These disputes included
such issues as whether GenBio or C&Y should be liable for accrued employee benefits,
vacation time, sick pay, and bonuses. June 4 Tr. 197-98.

C&Y demanded numerous

hours of free consultation and expert support, as well as use of GenBio's computer system,
i i at 198-99. There were also discussions regarding the fraction of the purchase price
that would be paid in cash, the portion that would be paid with a note, and whether the
purchase price would be reduced by $2,500 because of a computer GenBio had transferred
to California. Id, at 195, 196.
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The principal areas of dispute between the parties, however, centered upon the
disposition of certain equipment leases and the execution of non-competition covenants.24
The purchasers demanded that GenBio purchase outright all leased equipment and convey
title, free and clear, upon closing. June 4 Tr. 193. GenBio, by contrast, took the position
that the leases were simply included in the liabilities assumed by C&Y. \sL at 193, 199.
The lease question remained unresolved at the time GenBio received the final draft of the
agreement. |{L at 202.
The most significant "deal point," however, was C&Y's insistence that noncompetition and non-solicitation covenants be included in the contract. June 4 Tr. 200.
Every draft of the agreement produced by C&Y required GenBio not to compete in the sale
of IFA technology, and - more significantly - not to "call on, solicit or take away, or
attempt to call on, solicit to take away any of [C&Y's] customers." D. Exh. 46, para. 8.4
at 30. A note at the bottom of the first draft, written by GenBio's chief financial officer
(June 4 Tr. 241), explains why this provision was "absolutely impossible." D. Exh. 46,
para. 8.4 at 23. GenBio was developing the Immunodot technology precisely to compete
with the IFA process. As a result (id.):
we already contact current IFA customers and will continue to do so. We
can't guarantee the income of a technology which we know will be replaced
in the coming years!
After receipt of the second draft, which like the first contained the non-competition
and non-solicitation clauses, GenBio's attorney informed C&Y that "there was no way that
[GenBio] could enter into any kind of arrangement . . . where there was a non-solicitation
of customers clause . . . And I told [them] that this was a deal point, meaning that unless
there was going to be concession on their p a r t . . . it couldn't be a deal." June 4 Tr. 200.
And, although Condie inconsistently attempted to testify that all non-competition issues

June 3 Tr. 117 (Condie testifies on direct examination that most areas of disagreement were "worked
out" except for the "leases" and the "non-compete").
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had been resolved,25 he grudgingly admitted that there was no agreement on the clauses
and that he nevertheless directed C&Y's attorneys to retain them in the final draft
agreement. June 3 Tr. 219-20, 221; June 4 Tr. 3, 11-12, 32.
Throughout the negotiations on the various drafts, C&Y was repeatedly told that
formal approval of the agreement by the GenBio board was required. June 4 Tr. 186, 187,
189-90, 192, 197-98. On March 6, 1991, the third and final draft of the agreement which included the disputed lease and non-competition clauses - was presented to the
GenBio board. June 4 Tr. 202. After discussion, the board concluded that it was a "lousy
deal" and refused to approve it. i i . at 203.
Gephart thereafter wrote Condie that the proposed sale would not be consummated.
Gephart's letter stated (D. Exh. 51):
As you were advised on numerous occasions, any transaction relating to MRC
was subject to and contingent upon approval by the Board of Directors of
General Biometrics, Inc.
The Board has reviewed the matter and has determined that it is not currently
in the best interests of the Corporation to sell the assets of MRC.
Notwithstanding the board's non-approval of the transaction, Condie and Yarter still acting through their shell corporation C&Y - continued to insist upon performance in
accordance with the disputed terms of the third draft.

On March 12, 1991, C&Y's

attorneys wrote GenBio that C&Y was "prepared to close on the purchase of the . . . MRC
division's assets" on March 18 - the closing date set in the last draft. D. Exh. 49. The
letter informed GenBio that, on that date, C&Y would "proffer payment of $400,000 in
cash" as well as a "Promissory Note of the Purchaser in the amount of $97,500," for a
total purchase price of $497,500. icL The note was payable in two installments: $75,000

On direct examination by his own counsel, Condie first asserted that there was no agreement on noncompetition. June 3 Tr. 117. However, a few pages later - and still on direct examination - he asserted that
there was agreement on that issue. 1&. at 124. Then, when confronted with a letter from his attorney that
accompanied the final draft - and which stated that Condie had instructed his attorney to retain the noncompetition clauses in the agreement - Condie retracted his claim (made six pages earlier) that there was
agreement on the clauses by asserting "I didn't say that." ]£. at 130.
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in 90 days, with an additional $22,500 in 120 days. Jd.26
£t

Proceedings Below

Condie, Yarter and C&Y - whose corporate assets consisted of a filing cabinet and
adding machine in Condie's office (June 3 Tr. 227) - brought suit seeking damages of
$992,821 for breach of contract. June 4 Tr. 88. GenBio - who learned for the first time
after suit was filed that Condie and Yarter were, in fact, C&Y (June 2 Tr. 171; June 9 Tr.
123) - counterclaimed that the secret plans of its former directors and chairman of the
board to acquire the corporation's only profitable assets breached their fiduciary obligations.
1.

Evidence Presented on Plaintiffs' Claim

To prevail on their claim, Appellants had to establish two propositions: First, that
there was a contract of sale. Second, that the contract was authorized by GenBio. Zion's
First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988) (agent cannot
make its principal responsible for agent's actions unless agent is acting pursuant to actual
or apparent authority).
On the contract formation question, Appellants introduced Condie's testimony
(outlined above) that he orally accepted Gephart's alleged "counteroffer." Appellants also
introduced Condie's January 7 letter and Gephart's January 10 response as memoranda
of the purported contract. App. Br. Exhs. A, B.
On the authorization question, Appellants made two submissions: that the contract
was a "cash" sale preapproved by the GenBio board and, in any event, was within
Gephart's apparent authority. Appellants claimed that the GenBio board in November 1989
authorized a sale of the IFA assets for $500,000 cash (e.g.. D. Exh. 53; R. 1585) and that
Condie's and Gephart's letters constituted a "cash" sale contract.

To support this

assertion, they introduced conclusory testimony from Yarter that the proposed transaction
was "a cash offer." June 2 Tr. 213. Yarter, however, also testified that the transaction
involved cash and credit. Indeed, when asked on cross examination whether "the deal you
proposed" was "cash and credit," Yarter responded succinctly: "correct." June 2 Tr. 182.

Ct June 3 Tr. 252 (Condie testifies that his oral contract with Gephart required deferred payment to
be made "$75,000 in 75 days and $25,000 in 120 days") (emphasis added).
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See also id. at 201 (court acknowledges that Yarter testified "his offer was something
other than a cash sale").
Appellants' second authorization argument was that Condie's purported contract fell
within Gephart's apparent authority to bind GenBio. They attempted to establish apparent
authority with evidence that Gephart and Townsen dominated GenBio. Appellants claimed
that "many actions were taken at the insistence of these two persons without board
approval." App. Br. 5. But, despite Appellants' blatant (and unsupported) reiteration of
this claim in their brief (Mi), their evidence at trial established precisely the contrary.
Evidence of non-board approved "actions" included testimony that Gephart and/or
Townsen — but not the GenBio board — terminated prior president Norman Monson (June
2 Tr. 242), transferred GenBio's business to California (June 3 Tr. 12, 14), obtained certain
financing in Sweden (June 3 Tr. 87), required payment of GenBio funds to the Darox
corporation (June 2 Tr. 118), and paid Yarter $3,000 a month with Ventana funds (June
2 Tr. 144, 152). In addition, Condie, Yarter and C&Y argued that Ventana made numerous
loans to GenBio to obtain warrants as an inexpensive means of keeping control of the
corporation (June 3 Tr. 47-48), and contended that Gephart's review of certain corporate
records (June 2 Tr. 102), as well as his attendance at board meetings when he was not
a director (June 3 Tr. 78), demonstrated impermissible control.
However, the Appellants' own evidence established that Norman Monson's
termination was, in fact, approved by the GenBio board (June 3 Tr. 171-72), that the move
to California was, in fact, a part of the business reorganization plan approved by the board
(June 3 Tr. 243-44), that Gephart's actions in obtaining Swedish financing were, in fact,
approved by the GenBio board (June 2 Tr. 148), that the money supposedly sent to the
Darox corporation was, in fact, paid to Ventana (not Darox) to retire debt that was (at the
time of payment) due and payable (June 2 Tr. 145-46), and that Yarter was paid $3,000
a month without GenBio board approval because his compensation contract was with
Ventana - not GenBio (June 2 Tr. 145).
The other evidence of "domination" produced by the Appellants was equally frail.
Any warrants issued to Ventana as a result of loans to GenBio were never exercised and
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did not give Ventana voting rights or "control" of the corporation. June 3 Tr. 164-165;
June 7 Tr. 52. The minutes of the GenBio board, finally, demonstrated that, even though
Gephart may have inspected GenBio records and attended board meetings while not a
member, he never voted or acted as a board member except for the period when he was
a director. D. Exh. 53.
2.

Evidence Presented on the Counterclaim

To support its counterclaim, GenBio produced the evidence - summarized in
Subsections (B)(2) and (3), above - that Condie and Yarter conspired to acquire GenBio's
only profitable assets without full disclosure of their intentions to the board of directors.
The Appellants' evidence consisted of cross-examining defendants' witnesses. During
cross examination, Gephart admitted that he sat in for Townsen during at least one GenBio
board meeting while not a member of the board, but did not vote (June 9 Tr. 52; R. 158788) and examined certain records while not on the board (June 9 Tr. 53). Appellants also
established that Yarter introduced a potential purchaser, Preston Dorsett, to Gephart. June
2 Tr. 187. Gephart admitted negotiating with Dorsett in January 1991. June 9 Tr. 88-89.
3.

Decision of the trial court
a.

Appellants' claim

At the conclusion of Appellants' case-in-chief, GenBio moved for judgment under
Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P., because Appellants' own evidence established that there was
no contract (June 9 Tr. 178-81) and any agreement was not authorized, id,, at 182-90.
The court granted the motion. R. 1590.
The court found that there was "no meeting of the minds as to the specific terms
of the agreement." R. 1588. In particular, "Mr. Condie's January 7th letter was not an
acceptance of the oral offer of Mr. Gephart's [sic] because it varied the terms as to the
time of payment and the amount thereof." \JL Gephart's January 10 letter, in turn, "was
not an acceptance of the offer contained in the January 7th letter because the terms vary
on several essential points," including "establishing] a different sale price," describing the
sale as "assets and liabilities" rather than "assets," and establishing a condition that the
"plan for purchase and sale . . . would be taken to the Board . . . to receive formal
21

approval." \JL at 1588-89.
On the authorization issue, the court found that the contract had not been authorized
by the GenBio board in 1989 because it "was not a cash sale in excess of $500,000." R.
1586. And, as for Gephart's authority to bind GenBio, the court found that "the Board of
Directors of GenBio never gave Mr. Thomas Gephart [actual] authority to enter into a
contract" (id.) and the Appellants' evidence of "authority of control" did not confer
"apparent authority" upon Gephart.

R. 1587.

Indeed, in Finding of Fact No. 10, in

subparagraphs A through H, the trial court rejected as insufficient all proffered evidence of
Gephart's apparent authority. R. 1587-88. 27
b.

The counterclaim

At the conclusion of GenBio's evidence on the counterclaim, Appellants made their
own Rule 41 (b) motion. Counsel argued that the motion should be granted because, even
though former officers had made an undisclosed offer to acquire corporate assets, just as
"there's no harm in asking" there is "no harm in offering." June 9 Tr. 207.

Indeed,

counsel's primary submission was that "there have been no damages incurred." June 9
Tr. 209. 28 Although Condie and Yarter "tried to enforce an agreement," the "sale wasn't
made." IJL. As a result, "there's been no damage to these people out of this offer." id^
The trial court granted the Rule 41 (b) motion, essentially agreeing with counsel's "no sale - no harm" contention.
The court found that directors are liable for breach of fiduciary duty only when they

The court found that the board - not Gephart - terminated Monson; that the move to California was
part of the "overall business plan of the merger between Datagene and MRC;" that the board had authorized
the Swedish financing (i.e., the "Practitioner's Agreement"); that the claimed transfer of funds to Darox, in
fact, went to Ventana as "repayment that was proper;" and that Yarter's payments from Ventana resulted
from a contract with Ventana and thus "did not establish [Ventana's] control over GenBio." R. 1587-88. The
court also found that any loans to GenBio from Ventana "did not reflect payments for control of GenBio but,
rather, were investments in GenBio." JkL The court, finally, concluded that Gephart's visit to GenBio "did not
establish control of GenBio by Ventana" and his attendance at board meetings was not improper because he
did not act as a director, id.
28

Counsel also asserted that Yarter's introduction of Preston Dorsett, and Gephart's negotiation of a
possible sale to Dorsett, demonstrated Condie's and Yarter's "continuing good faith and their continuing to
exercise their judgment on behalf of the company." JdL at 208-09.
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actually acquire a corporate opportunity without disclosure. R. 1597-98.

9

The court

concluded that Condie and Yarter had merely "investigate^] the possible purchase" of the
IFA assets and, therefore, had not wdivert[ed] to themselves opportunities which in fairness
and equity belonged to GenBio." R. 1598. As the court explained in its oral ruling, an offer
was made and negotiated by Condie and Yarter but, when "it went to the board," they
"didn't get board approval. And so there really was no breach of corporate opportunity or
breach of fiduciary duty." June 10 Tr. 54.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Contrary to Appellants' brief, the trial court found - not that any contract was too
indefinite to be enforced (App. Br. 23-30) - but, rather, that there was "no meeting of the
minds." R. 1588-89. Moreover, any challenge to this finding, as Appellants well know (R.
587-88), presents factual rather than legal questions. Accordingly, the appeal should be
dismissed for Appellants' total failure to marshal the evidence. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold
Storage and Warehouse, Inc.. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25-26 (Utah App. 1994).
Even if the Court reaches the merits of the appeal, it must affirm. The trial court's
finding that there was no manifestation of mutual assent (R. 1588) is not clearly erroneous.
Indeed, the January 7 and 10 letters invoked by Appellants (App. Br. Exhs. A, B) do not
constitute an offer and acceptance because they differ on many essential points and, in any
event, are too indefinite to be enforced.
Any contract, furthermore, was never properly authorized by GenBio. Yarter himself
admitted that the Appellants' offer involved "cash and credit." June 2 Tr. 182. The offer,
therefore, does not fall within the board's authorization of a "cash sale." June 7 Tr. 33.
Nor did Gephart or Townsen have apparent authority to accept the offer without board
approval. Appellants have not identified - nor did the trial court find - a single instance
where GenBio permitted Gephart or Townsen to act without board approval.
The trial court's findings are not fatallv inconsistent. Because the trial court found

The court noted that, absent full disclosure, a director's fiduciary obligations "forbid!] a corporate
director from acquiring for his own benefit an opportunity that would have been valuable and germane to the
corporation's business." R. 1597-98 (emphasis added).
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that there was no contract, whether or not the contract was authorized (as well as any
possible inconsistency in the findings regarding apparent authority) is immaterial.

In

addition, Appellants assured the trial court that its apparent authority findings were not
inconsistent (R. 1532} and are estopped from now asserting the contrary. The trial court's
findings, in any event, are not inconsistent. The challenged findings demonstrate only that
Gephart and Townsen had significant influence in the operation of GenBio - not that
GenBio acquiesced in their actions without board approval.
On the cross appeal, the Court should find that Appellants have breached their
fiduciary duties. The fact that Appellants were ultimately unsuccessful in their asset grab
does not excuse their persistent conduct contrary to the best interests of GenBio. The
"essence of the [Appellants'] wrong was in the acquiring of information while [a] relation
of confidence existed, terminating the relation and immediately thereafter using the
information so acquired against the interest" of GenBio. Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park
Galena Mining Co.. 296 P. 231, 240 (Utah 1931).

This conduct breached not only

Appellants' duty of loyalty, but their obligation of good faith and fair dealing. GenBio is
entitled to recover all unnecessary legal costs incurred as a result of this wrongful conduct.
GenBio, finally, is entitled to recover costs and attorneys' fees incurred in opposing
this frivolous appeal. "Since a valid professional evaluation would reveal a complete lack
of merit . . . and because of the otherwise unprofessional presentation of this case on
appeal," Appellants and their counsel are "subject to sanction" under Rule 33(a), Utah R.
App. P. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1990).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE

The fundamental question presented - raised on the second page of Appellants' brief
but nowhere else directly addressed by them - is whether "the trial court err[ed] in
determining that there was no contract" between "C&Y Corporation and Defendant
GenBio."

App. Br. 2.

This is a factual finding that can only be set aside if clearly

erroneous. Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. Appellants, however, do not even attempt to
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marshal the evidence to discredit this crucial finding. Accordingly, the appeal should be
dismissed for failure to marshal the evidence. Ono lnt'1 (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.,
850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc..
235-36 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (Utah App. 1994).
The basic issue underlying this entire litigation is whether GenBio and the Appellants
entered into a contract. Without a contract, all of Appellants' claims - that the contract
was authorized as a "cash" sale (App. Br. 13-16) or by Gephart's apparent authority (App.
Br. 16-23), that the contract is specific enough to be enforced (App. Br. 23-31), and that
the findings on apparent authority are inconsistent (App. 31-36) - are starkly irrelevant.
Why?

Because, if there is no contract, all quibbles on subsidiary issues (such as

contractual authorization or specificity) evaporate.
The trial court unequivocally found - not, as Appellants argue - that the contract
was "not sufficiently definite" to be enforced (App. Br. 23-24), but rather that there was
no contract. The trial court found that "there was no meeting of the minds as to the
specific terms" of any agreement between the parties. R. 1588. The court, in short, found
that "the nature of the telephone conversations, letters, and subsequent negotiations
between the parties' attorneys established the parties' intent to enter an agreement to
negotiate a final contract, but that final contract was never signed or agreed upon by the
parties." R. 1589. See Statement, Subsections B(4), (5); C(3)(a), above.
These findings are findings of fact. The absence of contractual intent is not, as
Appellants claim, a question of law reviewed for mere correctness. App. Br. 2. Rather,
whether "the writings relied on by [Appellants] '. . . amount to the agreement needed to
give to [Appellants] the property interest claimed'" is a finding of fact that may not be set
aside unless against "the great weight of the evidence." Southland Corp. v. Potter. 760
P.2d 320, 321 (Utah App. 1988). 30

Appellants, moreover, know this.

Indeed, in

Accord West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) (issues of "the
parties' contractual intent" are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous standard"); Saunders v.
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991) (contractual intent "is a matter of fact"); Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990) (contractual intent presents questions of fact). See also Wade v. Stanol, 869
P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994) (whether parties had contracted to allocate property taxes is question of fact);
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control. Inc.. 866 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App. 1993) (whether a writing has been
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opposing GenBio's motion for summary judgment, Appellants asserted that "if parties
dispute the existence of a contract, whether they had the intent to form a contract is a
factual issue" R. 587 (emphasis in original) (citing O'Hara v. Hall. 628 P.2d 1289, 1291
(Utah 1981)).
Because the fundamental question is whether "the trial court err[ed] in determining
that there was no contract" (App. Br. 2), Appellants were obligated to marshal the evidence
demonstrating that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. To do so, they were
required to gather all evidence supporting the conclusion that there was no contract (Alta
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993)), and then, "[ajfter constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, . . . ferret out a fatal flaw . . . ." West
Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). They have not
done so. As a result, their appeal should be dismissed.
Appellate courts will not reach the merits of an appeal unless the appellant has
properly "marshaled the evidence." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App.
1993).

The marshaling requirement '"serves the important function of reminding the

litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial/"
Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Moore, 802
P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). Further, marshaling "provides the appellate court the
basis from which to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of facts challenged on
appeal."

Robb, 863 P.2d at 1328.

This Court's "insistence on compliance with the

marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over
substance." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992). "A reviewing court
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply
a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research."
i l l (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988).

adopted as a final and complete expression of an agreement is question of fact); O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d
1289, 1291 (Utah 1981) ("Where the existence of a contract is the point in issue and the evidence is
conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to determine whether the contract did in fact
exist") (quoting Thornton v. Pasch. 139 P.2d 1002 (1943)).
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This is not a case where marshaling would prove ineffectual. As GenBio's Statement
amply demonstrates, this is not a case where there is no evidence in the record supporting
the trial court's findings, Krauss v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 852 P.2d 1014, 1022
(Utah App. 1993), nor is it a case where the trial court's findings are legally inadequate.
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993); Amos v. Board of Review, 821
P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App. 1991). 31

Appellants have simply pressed this appeal in total

disregard of the "broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial." Woodward v. Fazzio.
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1990).
The Appellants' complete failure to marshal the evidence in a factual statement
containing but a single citation to the transcript (App. Br. 7) not only disregards the
deference owed the trial court, it has also placed an unfair burden on GenBio. As this
Court noted in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc., 236 Utah Adv.
Rep. 24, 26 (Utah App. 1994):
When appellants do not marshal the evidence in support of disputed findings,
they place appellees or respondents in a precarious position. Prudent
appellees likely will not rely solely on an assertion that the appellant has failed
to marshal the evidence; rather, appellees are compelled to perform the
marshaling process to protect their position.
In short, appellees are
constrained to do the appellant's work, usually at considerable time and
expense.
Appellants' abdication of their clear appellate responsibilities has imposed significant costs
on GenBio. Indeed, the attorney who digested the transcript and drafted the Statement of
the Case spent over 60 hours occupied with those endeavors. Appendix A, attached
(Affidavit of Richard G. Wilkins).

As a result, a significant portion of the legal costs

associated with this appeal have been improperly shifted from Appellants to GenBio.
Such cost shifting is unfair in any appeal. The Appellants' failure to marshal the
evidence, however, is particularly problematic in light of various unsupported avowals in
their Statement. Without citation to any evidence, and despite the occasional express
stipulation to the contrary (June 7 Tr. 52) (stipulation regarding Ventana's 24% stock

Although Appellants argue that the trial court's findings are "inadequate" because they are
"inconsistent" (App. Br. 31-36), they are not. £e§ Argument Section IV, below.
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ownership), Appellants have blithely asserted that Ventana controls a "super-majority of
the stock of GenBio" (App. Br. 4)# that GenBio "aggressively" sought to sell its IFA assets
(id. at 6), and that Condie's and Yarter's purchase plans were made "in passing." Id. All
of the foregoing are demonstrably misleading, if not flatly erroneous.32

Nor are the

foregoing isolated examples.33
Another illustration of Appellants' pattern of unsupported factual assertions is the
claim that GenBio's attorney told Condie, at the end of the purchase agreement
negotiations, that Condie "was 'getting screwed/"

App. Br. 9.

As with the other

submissions noted above, this inflammatory "quotation" is made without citation. GenBio,
after carefully reading and digesting the transcript and trial exhibits, has uncovered most
of the distortions in the Appellants' Statement. GenBio, however, has been unable to
discover anywhere in the trial court record the reference to intimate bodily functions quoted
by Appellants.
Such an assertion may - or may not - be lurking somewhere in the 1,276 pages of
testimony and reams of exhibits presented before the trial court. Such an assertion may - or may not - be contradicted by other evidence buried in the record below. But, be that
as it may, if Appellants wish to rely on such an assertion in pressing an appeal before this
Court, they unquestionably have the obligation to identify to the Court - and to GenBio the evidentiary basis for their emotionally charged claim. Oneida/SUC. 236 Utah Adv. Rep.

June 2 Tr. 52 (24% stock ownership); kL at 87 (only two marketing attempts were made); Statement
Subsection B(3), above I Appellants' extensive purchase plans).
33

Appellants also assert - again without citation to evidentiary support - that one potential purchaser
"did not feel that MRC was worth buying at almost any price." App. Br. 6. The evidence produced by the
Appellants, however, demonstrates - not that the IFA facility was worthless - but that it had considerable
value.
Appellants introduced testimony from Preston Dorsett, who negotiated to purchase the IFA facility for
a brief period in late 1990 and early 1991. June 4 Tr. 41-46. Dorsett offered between $500,000 and
$600,000 for the IFA assets based solely upon his appraisal of the book value of the company and reasonable
sales volumes for the "toxic plasma antigen." l^L at 57. That price, furthermore, did not include any value for
IFA testing because Dorsett wasn't "directly interested in that." JcL at 58. And, according to Dorsett, the IFA
testing technology "certainly also had an additional value." i i Accordingly, the evidence produced by
Appellants shows - not that the IFA facility was not "worth buying at almost any price" (App. Br. 6) - but
rather that those assets were worth at least $ 100,000 more than what was offered by Appellants, even
without consideration of the IFA facility's principal business: production and marketing of IFA test kits.
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at 25-26.

Without such support, neither the Court, nor GenBio, can be assured that

appellate review will take its proper course. | ^
Utah appellate courts have shown no reluctance in rejecting appeals if the appellant
does not comply with the marshaling requirement.34 This appeal should be dismissed for
failure to marshal the evidence. Oneida/SLIC. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 ("Because Oneida
has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the factual findings which it disputes, we
decline to reach the merits of its appeal").
H.

THERE IS NO CONTRACT

Appellants have not directly addressed the fundamental holding of the district court - Le^, that there was "no meeting of the minds" (R. 1588) - but, instead, have assumed
the existence of the contract and, in turn, have asserted that "the agreement between the
parties was . . . sufficiently definite" to be enforced. App. Br. 23-24. The trial court's
finding that there was no "agreement," however, is not clearly erroneous and must be
affirmed. And, even if this Court were to disregard the trial court's finding that there was
no meeting of the minds, the January 7 and 10 letters are insufficiently definite to be
enforced.
A,

The Trial Court's Finding That There Was "No Meeting Of The Minds"
Is Not Clearly Erroneous

Depending upon how one reads Appellants' brief, their entire appeal rests upon the
proposition that either Condie's January 7 letter or Gephart's January 10 letter constitute
the "contract."

See, e.g.. App. Br. 8 ("[o]n January 7, 1991, Condie sent a letter to

Gephart accepting the $500,000 cash offer"); id^ at 24 (asserting that "'[t]he plain
language of the letter agreement of Gephart'" constitutes the contract). Indeed, Appellants
go so far as to assert that Gephart's letter "slams shut any further argument" regarding the

34

Lfl^ Ono Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993); Oneida/SLIC v.
Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (Utah App. 1994); Hamilton v. Hamilton,
869 P.2d 971, 975, 977 (Utah App. 1994); Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993);
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic lnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991): Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d
143, 149 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d
910, 912 (Utah App. 1992); Smallwood v. Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716, 719 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
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terms of the supposed contract. App. Br. 24. With due respect, however, the only thing
Appellants' submission slams shut is every text, treatise and case dealing with contract
formation.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the essential pre-condition to
contract formation "is a manifestation of mutual assent."

Restatement (Second) of

Contracts § 17(1) (1981). This manifestation of mutual assent, or (to use the trial court's
term) "meeting of the minds" (R. 1588), is evidenced by the making and acceptance of an
offer, id^ § § 24, 30. An "offer" is defined as "the manifestation of willingness to enter
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain is invited and will conclude it." UL § 24. And, while an "offer" can be accepted
"in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances" (\sL at § 30(2)), there
is one course of action that emphatically does not result in contract formation: the making
of a counter-offer. |cL § 39.
A "counter-offer" is defined as:
an offer made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same matter as the
original offer and proposing a substitute bargain differing from that proposed
by the original offer.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 39(1) (1991) (emphasis added). The making of a
counter-offer terminates the "offeree's power of acceptance" and prevents the formation
of a contract. Id± § 39(2). To create a contract in short, the parties must express their
mutual assent to one and the same agreement.

17A Am. Jur. Contracts 2d § 86

(1991). 35
The basic principles set out above are fundamentals of Utah law. "A meeting of the

Accord, 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 43 (1963) ("An acceptance to become effective must be positive and
unambiguous. In order to create a contract, the acceptance of the offer must be unequivocal; further to
become effective the acceptance must be absolute and unqualified;" "An acceptance, to be effectual, must
be identical with the offer and unconditional; and where a person offers to do a definite thing, and another
accepts conditionally or introduces a new term into the acceptance, his answer is either a mere expression of
willingness to deal or it is a counter proposal, and in neither case is there an agreement"), J i at 683 ("In other
words, a proposal to accept or an acceptance introducing new conditions or terms varying from those offered
amounts to a rejection of the offer and the submission of a counter proposal and puts an end to the
negotiations without forming a contract unless the party making the offer renews or agrees to the suggested
modifications").
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minds between contracting parties is essential to the formation of any contract."
Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clavton. 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah App. 1993). 36 And, as
found by the trial court, neither the January 7 nor the January 10 letters invoked by
Appellants evidence that the parties ever expressed their assent to one and the same
agreement.
According to Condie's sworn testimony, the oral "counteroffer" he purported to
accept with his January 7 letter was to purchase the IFA facility for "$450,000 with
$350,000 cash, $100,000 in I believe 90 days." June 3 Tr. 101. His letter, however,
provided for payment of the final, non-cash installment in 75 to 120 - not 90 - days (App.
Br. Exh. A) and was inconsistent regarding the purchase price: the letter could be read,
variously, as proposing either a $500,000 or $450,000 sales price. Id. 37 Accordingly,
and as found by the trial court, Condie's January 7 letter "was not an acceptance" of the
purported oral counteroffer made by Gephart but was, instead, yet another counteroffer
because "it varied the terms as to the time of payment and the amount thereof." R. 1588.
The January 10 letter from Gephart, in turn, cannot be construed as an absolute,
unqualified acceptance of Condie's January 7 counteroffer.38 To begin with, the letter
recited - not that unqualified agreement had been reached - but rather that "we generally
agree with your proposal." App. Br. Exh. B. In addition, Gephart's letter (1) modified the
payment terms of Condie's letter, increasing Section (B) of that letter "to $400,000 instead of $350,000," (2) altered the terms of the transaction by providing for a sale of
"assets and liabilities" rather than "assets" as described by Condie, and (3) added an
express condition, not contained in Condie's letter, of board approval. App. Br. Exh. B.

"Mutual assent of the parties is essential to create a binding contract." Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597 (1962)}. See also John Call
Engineering v. Manti Citv Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987)(quoting Oberhanslv v. Earle, 572 P.2d
1384 (Utah 1977)) ("It is a basic principle of contract law that there can be no contract without the mutual
assent of the parties"); Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961) (there must be "a meeting of the
minds of the parties").
The interlineations on the letter presented to the Court (App. Br. Exh. A) were inserted later by Condie
and were not on the letter originally sent to Gephart. June 3 Tr. 102.
38

17 CJ.S. Contracts S 43 (1963) (an "acceptance must be absolute and unqualified").
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Therefore, as found by the trial court, "Mr. Gephart's January 10th letter was not an
acceptance of the offer contained in the January 7th letter." R. 1588.
The above-noted differences among and between Gephart's purported oral
counteroffer and the January letters are not mere trifles.

Appellants' own authority

establishes that the "[e]ssential terms" of a contract include "a description of the property
sold, the price, the time and manner of payment and any other terms in the agreement
which are essential to the agreement." Application of Sing Chono Co., Ltd., 617 P.2d 578,
581 (Haw. App. 1980) (cited at App. Br. 25). 39 And, even cursory review of the January
7 and 10 letters reveals inconsistencies regarding the property sold (is it "assets and
liabilities" or merely "assets"?), the price (is it $450,000 or $500,000?), the time and
manner of payment (are the terms $350,000 or $400,000 cash with the remainder in 75,
90 or 120 days?) and other terms essential to the agreement (what about the written
contract of purchase required by Condie and the board approval required by Gephart?).
The record plainly establishes what the trial court found: "there was no meeting of
the minds as to the specific terms" of any agreement between the parties. R. 1588. This
Court, therefore, should affirm the trial court's holding that GenBio has no contractual
obligation to convey its only profitable assets to two former corporate officers.
EL

The Letters Invoked By Appellants Are Too Indefinite To Be Enforced

Appellants' arguments regarding contractual "specificity" (App. Br. 23-30) are
irrelevant. None of the cases cited by Appellants discuss lack of mutual assent. On the
contrary, in every case cited, the courts found that the parties had mutually reached
agreement.40 The issue in Appellants' cases, in short, was not whether there had been

Accord Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982) (cited at
App. Br. 26) (noting that, while a contract need not provide for "every collateral matter or possible
contingency," it must - at a minimum - provide certainty regarding the "subject matter" and "consideration"
involved).
40

Application of Sino Chono Co., Ltd., 617 P.2d 578, 580 (Haw. App. 1980) ("By Agreement dated
November 13, 1948, petitioners-appellants . . . agreed to purchase Lot K of Land Court Application No. 1594
of Sing Chong Co., Ltd., from Sing Chong Co., Ltd."); Qkun v. Morton, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (Cal. App.
1988) (plaintiff and defendant "entered into an agreement"); Citv of Maiden v. Green, 779 S.W.2d 354, 355
(Mo. App. 1989) ("The contract was dated March 2, 1981, and was apparently considered by the parties to
be in effect until terminated by plaintiff effective March 1, 1986"); Stanot v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1318
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a "meeting of the minds" (R. 1588) but, rather, whether an undoubted agreement could
be enforced. Here, there was no agreement. But, even if the Court looks to the terms of
the January 7 and 10 letters, it is abundantly clear that they are too indefinite to be
enforced.
GenBio has no quibbles with the law Appellants quote.

Once there is actual

agreement, courts indeed "'favor the determination that an agreement is sufficiently
definite/" App. Br. 25 (quoting Application of Sing Chona Co.. Ltd.. 617 P.2d at 581).
However, as Appellants also note, agreements will not be enforced if they are so uncertain
or incomplete that a court does not "know[] what to enforce." App. Br. 25. This is just
such a case.
Appellants' own authority establishes that certain "essential terms" of a contract
must be specified or it will be too indefinite to be enforced.41 Many such terms are left
unresolved by the January 7th and 10th letters. Is the property sold "assets" (App. Br.
Exh. A) or "assets and liabilities"? App. Br. Exh. B. Assuming that the agreement is for
the transfer of "assets and liabilities," do the "liabilities" include (June 4 Tr. 193) or
exclude (June 4 Tr. 193, 199) the equipment leases? Is the price $450,000 (App. Br. Exh.
A), $500,000 (App. Br. Exh. B) or the $497,500 ultimately tendered by Appellants? D.
Exh. 49. How much is to be paid in cash - $350,000 (App. Br. Exh. A) or $400,000?
App. Br. Exh. B. Is the remainder to be paid in 75 (App. Br. Exh. A), 90 (June 3 Tr. 101),
or 120 days after closing? App. Br. Exh. A. And, what of the non-competition and nonsolicitation covenants? They apparently were "essential to the agreement" (Application of
Sine Chong Co.. Ltd.. 617 P.2d at 581) because, despite GenBio's opposition (June 4 Tr.

(Utah 1976) ("On October 12, 1972, the parties entered into a written contract"); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d
548, 550 (Utah App. 1987) (written Earnest Money Agreement was signed by both purchaser and seller of
land); Blackhurst v. TransAmerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985) ("The essential terms of the
settlement contract were agreed to by Transamerica's Representative"); Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John New &
Assoc, 641 P.2d 144, 145 (Utah 1982) (parties executed a "contract to purchase approximately twenty
acres of undeveloped real estate").
41

Application of Sing Chona Co., Ltd., 617 P.2d at 581 ("essential terms" include "a description of the
property sold, the price, the time and manner of payment and any other terms in the agreement which are
essential to the agreement"). Accord Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc. Inc.. 641 P.2d 146 (Utah
1982).

33

200), Condie directed C&Y's attorneys to retain them in the final draft of the purchase
agreement. June3Tr. 219-20, 221; June4Tr. 3, 11-12, 32. Are they in? Are they out?
This case, in short, bears virtually no similarity to the principal case relied upon by
Appellants. Rand-Whitnev Packaging Corp. v. Robertson Group. Inc., 651 F. Supp. 520 (D.
Mass. 1986). Indeed, far from presenting a "fact situation that is virtually identical to the
present case" (App. Br. 27), Rand-Whitnev's facts are strikingly unlike the record here. In
Rand-Whitnev. the trial court found a binding contract (651 F. Supp. at 530) - not a lack
of mutual assent. R. 1588. In Rand-Whitnev. the parties successfully engaged in lengthy
negotiations and due diligence. 651 F. Supp. at 525-31. Here, by contrast, the detailed,
specific negotiations between the parties broke down. R. 1589 (court notes failure to
agree on non-competition clauses and the disposition of various GenBio liabilities). In
addition, and unlike the present case, the parties in Rand-Whitnev identified specific assets,
agreed on how to handle specific liabilities, and signed a detailed letter of intent. 651 F.
Supp. at 521-34. Because of these (and other) vital factual distinctions between RandWhitnev and the present case, the trial court found the case completely inapposite.42
In fact, rather than being even remotely analogous to the authority cited by
Appellants, this case is quite like Southland Corp. v. Potter. 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App.
1988).

In Southland, this Court refused to enforce a contract purportedly granting an

express easement - even though the plaintiff produced a letter (signed by the defendant)
reciting that "we will allow an access right-of-way in from 6200 South." 760 P.2d at 321.
Because the language in the letter could be given various interpretations, the Court found
a "lack of mutual assent for the express easement Southland claims." 760 P.2d at 322.
The Court, in short, found that because a "range of meanings" could be attributed to the

42

The trial court held that Rand-Whitnev did not control the present case because, there, the "parties . .
. engaged in extensive negotiations in which they dealt with many of the specific details for making the
agreement prior to making the contract." R. 1591. Here, however, "plaintiffs did not present evidence that
such details had been agreed upon prior to the time the contract was alleged to have been made." jcL. See
also R. 1591 (finding that the seller in Rand-Whitnev "told prospective purchasers the company had been
sold" while "GenBio's conduct indicated that MRC was still for sale"); R. 1591-92 (finding that in "RandWhitnev a specific proposal to sell to a specific company was taken to the board of directors," while here
"[t]he only agreement reached . . . was an agreement to negotiate a final purchase and sale contract" which
after "good faith" negotiations was not achieved).
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letter, "the writing lacks essential terms and provisions." J i .

"If Southland cannot

articulate and define with specificity the property interest claimed, the court cannot." J^L
The January 7 and 10 letters invoked by Appellants nowhere define with specificity
the terms of the proposed sale. They can, instead, be given a broad "range of meanings,"
and as a result "lack[] essential terms and provisions." Southland, 760 P.2d at 322.
"Under the circumstances shown to exist here, where there was simply some nebulous
notion in the air that a contract might be entered into in the future, the court cannot
fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it." I&. at 322
(quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (1961)). 43
III.

ANY PURPORTED AGREEMENT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY GENBIO

Because the trial court's finding that there was no meeting of the minds {R. 1588)
is not clearly erroneous, the Court need not address whether Appellants' purchase offer (a)
was a "cash" transaction authorized by GenBio's board or (b) fell within Gephart's apparent
authority to accept. Because there is no contract, questions of authorization are beside the
point. But, out of an abundance of caution, GenBio addresses these issues briefly. Yarter's
own admission - and bounteous authority - establish that Appellants' offer was not a
"cash" transaction. The record, moreover, unequivocally demonstrates that GenBio did not
confer apparent authority upon Gephart to accept the Appellants' offer without board
approval.
AL

Appellants Offered Cash And Credit. Not Cash

Appellants' proposed transaction involved some amount of money44 "cash" (e.g.,
App. Br. Exh. A) with the remainder - evidenced by a note (D. Exh. 49) - payable in 75, 45
90, 46 or 120 days.47 They assert (App. Br. 13-16) that this was a "cash" transaction

43

Accord Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah 1985) (Utah Supreme Court refuses to
enforce contract for conveyance of land because "there simply was no agreement on a definite property
description").
44

1&, $450,000 (App. Br. Exh. A), $497,500 (D. Exh. 49), or $500,000 (App. Br. Exh. B).

45

App. Br. Exh. A.

4e

June3Tr. 101.
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authorized by the GenBio board because Yarter testified that "cash later" is "the same as
cash now." June 2 Tr. 181. This remarkable position is factually and legally untenable.
To begin with, the "great weight of the evidence" hardly establishes that Appellants
proposed a cash transaction. Southland. 760 P.2d at 321. Yarter, of course, testified that
the transaction would involve "cash." E.g.. June 2, Tr. 213. And to the extent that the
January letters do not contemplate eventual payment in wampum, first born children or
confederate war bonds, he is correct. But, contrary to Appellants' emphatic submission
that "[tlhere is no. evidence opposing" Yarter's testimony that Appellants made a cash offer
(App. Br. 15) (emphasis in original), there AS such evidence - and from Yarter himself. On
cross examination, when asked whether "the deal you proposed" was "cash and credit,"
he answered: "Correct." June 2 Tr. 182. This testimony, moreover, did not escape the
trial court. kL at 201 (court notes Yarter testified his proposal was "something other than
a cash sale").
Furthermore, Yarter's bald-faced claim that "cash later" is "the same as cash now"
(June 2 Tr. 181) defies human experience. The authorities are legion which establish that
a "cash sale" - to use Yarter's felicitous phraseology - means "cash now." June 2 Tr.
181. 4 8 Any exchange involving "cash later" ( j d j , by contrast, is a credit - not a cash -

47

D. Exh. 49.

48

E.g., Ballentine's Law Dictionary 179 (3rd ed. 1969) (defining "cash sale" as "[a] sale by the terms of
which payment of the purchase price and delivery of the goods sold are to be concurrent. . . . Upon such a
sale the owner is not bound to deliver the goods until the price is paid"); Black's Law Dictionary 217 (6th ed.
1990) (defining "cash sale" as "[a] sale for money in hand. A sale conditioned on payment concurrent with
delivery"); 60 Am Jur 2d Payment § 32 (1987) ("General rule requiring payment in money") ("Unless the
parties agree otherwise, or the obligee consents to receive some other medium, payment of an obligation may
be made only in money, and it follows that a tender must be made in money or in that which by law passes as
money for the payment of debts"); 60 Am Jur 2d Payment § 37 (1987) ("Meaning of terms as to medium")
("'Cash' is generally taken to mean ready money at command, subject to free disposal and not tied up in a
fixed state"); 54 Am Jur 2d Money § 2 (1971) ("'Cash' and related terms") ("Although the terms 'money' and
'cash' are often used interchangeably, 'money' is the more general term and stresses the medium or token,
whereas 'cash' stresses the readiness of the medium, as distinguished from credit and slow assets. 'Cash'
means especially 'ready money' at command, subject to free disposal and not tied up in a fixed state; it is
almost the equivalent of the term 'loose money'").
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transaction.49

Accordingly, Appellants' offer was a cash and credit transaction not

authorized by the GenBio board. R. 1586.
fl^

GenBio Has Not Conferred Upon Geohart The Apparent Authority To
Act Without Board Approval

To establish Gephart's apparent authority, Appellants argued below - and reassert
here - that "many actions" were taken "at the insistence of [Gephart and Townsen]
without board approval." App. Br. 5. At trial, however, Appellants did not uncover even
a single example of a corporate decision made by Gephart or Townsen without board
approval. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that Gephart lacked apparent authority to
accept Appellants' offer without board approval (R. 1587-88) is not clearly erroneous. See
Notes 3, 4 above (contract formation questions reviewed for clear error).
w

[A]n agent's apparent or ostensible authority flows only from the acts and conduct

of the principal." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 763 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah
1988). Thus, to establish Gephart's apparent authority to act without board approval,
Appellants must establish that GenBio (1) "has manifested [its] consent to the exercise of
such authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume the exercise of such
authority" and (2) that Appellants, "acting in good faith, had reason to believe, and did
actually believe, that the agent possessed such authority." Luddinqton v. Bodenvest Ltd.,
855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 1993) (Quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d Aaencv § 80 (1986)). 50 The
record and the trial court's findings refute Appellants' contention that the acts and conduct
of GenBio led them to reasonably believe that Gephart or Townsen could bind GenBio
without board approval.
Appellants attempted to establish Gephart's apparent authority by claiming he - not
the board — had terminated a prior corporate president, transferred GenBio's business to

49

LSL, 70 C.J.S. Payment S 17(a) (1987) (Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, In General") ("A
promissory note does not constitute a cash payment"); Black's Law Dictionary 369-70 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "credit sale" as "[a] sale in which the buyer is permitted to pay for the goods at a later time, as
contrasted with a cash sale").
50

Accord Citv Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrvsler-Plvmouth. 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) (apparent authority
"is premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct of its agent which has led
third parties to rely upon the agent's actions").
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California, obtained financing in Sweden, transferred GenBio funds to a third corporation,
and paid Yarter with Ventana (not GenBio) funds. See Statement, Subsection C(1), above.
In addition, they asserted that Gephart improperly reviewed corporate documents and
attended board meetings while not a director. IsL. However, the trial court - based upon
Appellants' own evidence - found that all of the foregoing actions were either taken with
board approval or did not demonstrate improper control. Note 3 1 , above.
Appellants, furthermore, can hardly claim, "acting in good faith, [that they] did
actually believe" that Gephart and Townsen could act without board approval. Luddinaton.
855 P.2d at 208-09. The corporate minutes - and Appellants' testimony - reflect that
Condie and Yarter knew that the "control" supposedly exercised by Gephart or Townsen
was, in every instance, approved by the board. E.g., June 2 Tr. 242, June 3 Tr. 171-72
(Monson termination); June 3 Tr. 12, 14, June 3 Tr. 243-44 (move of GenBio to
California); June 3 Tr. 87, June 2 Tr. 148 (Swedish financing); June 2 Tr., 118, 145-46
(repayment of Ventana debt); June 2 Tr. 144, 145, 152 (payment of Yarter). As members
of the GenBio board that approved these actions, Condie and Yarter can hardly assert that
they actually believed Gephart or Townsen could act without that approval.
Because the trial court specifically found that no actions "were taken at the
insistence of [Gephart or Townsen] without board approval" (App. Br. 5), Appellants are
left with general complaints that Ventana's consistent funding of GenBio gave Gephart and
Townsen a lot of power.51

But, aside from general moans, groans and outright

fabrication,52 Appellants are unable to cite to a single example of a corporate decision
made by Gephart or Townsen without board approval. Left in this quandary, they are
51

See, e.Q., App. Br. 18-19 (because GenBio "is totally dependent" upon Ventana, the corporation is "a
hostage, an alter ego of Gephart and his venture capital firm").
82

Appellants erroneously assert that "it was Gephart who made the decision to hire John Gordy as
president of GenBio, not the Board of Directors." App. Br. 5. Corporate minutes, dated May 12, 1988,
however, recite that Gordy's employment was approved by the board. D. Exh. 53 (Minutes Of A Special
Meeting Of The Board Of Directors Of General Biometrics, Inc., May 12, 1988) ("RESOLVED, that the Board
of Directors approves the individual Employment Contracts for John T. Gordy, as negotiated by Mr. Gephart
and as written by MacDonald, Halsted & Laybourne, outside legal counsel to the Company"). And, also
contrary to Appellants' claim (App. Br. 5), Gephart was a director of GenBio at the time Gordy's employment
contract was negotiated and approved by the board. D. Exh. 53 (Minutes Of A Special Meeting Of The Board
Of Directors Of General Biometrics, Inc., May 12, 1988).
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forced to argue that the trial court made "specific findings of fact which plainly establish
. . . [that GenBio] completely surrendered its business to Gephart."

App. Br. 19.

Hyperbole, however, is no substitute for substance.
The trial court did make certain findings which confirm that Gephart and Townsen
exercised significant influence in GenBio's corporate decisionmaking. See generally App.
Br. 19-21.

But, at the outset of these supposedly problematic findings, the trial court

specifically found that Gephart's and Townsen's actions "did not rise to the level of being
a violation of law." R. 1593. And, even more importantly, none of these findings establish
that GenBio conferred apparent authority upon Gephart or Townsen to act without board
approval. Indeed, not one of the findings quoted by Appellants establish that Gephart or
Townsen in fact acted without GenBio board approbation. Finding 34, for example, merely
states that Gephart and Townsen approved the proposed sale of the IFA facility before the
matter went "to the board of directors for approval." R. 1597.
Thus, although the trial court did find that Gephart and Townsen had significant
influence in GenBio's operations, the court also found - and the record unequivocally
establishes - that each and every instance of this purported "control" was, in fact, formally
approved by the GenBio board. As a result, the trial court's conclusion that Gephart and
Townsen were not clothed with apparent authority to act without board approval is neither
contradictory nor clearly erroneous and must be affirmed. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 762 P.2d
at 1095.
IV.

I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE NOT FATALLY INCONSISTENT

As noted above, the trial court made findings on the counterclaim that Appellants
assert are inconsistent with earlier rulings on their case-in-chief.

In its Counterclaim

Findings of Fact 3-10, 23, 28, 29, and 34, the court found that Gephart and Townsen had
significant influence in appointing directors, dealing with employees, resolving disputes,
recalling loans, and conducting negotiations. Findings 6, 7, 8, 10, 28, 29; R. 1593-94,
1596. Contrary to Appellants' claim, none of these findings fatally undermines the court's
judgment.
A^

The Trial Court's Judgment Must Be Affirmed Notwithstanding Any
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Possible Inconsistency
To begin with, any "inconsistency" in the court's ruling involves only Gephart's or
Townsen's apparent authority to bind GenBio to a contract. But, because the court found
that there was no contract (R. 1588), any possible inconsistency in the court's apparent
authority findings is immaterial.
As Appellants' authority demonstrates, a trial court must make factual findings "'on
all the material issues raised by the pleadings/" Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1339
(Utah 1979) (quoting Prows v. Hawlev. 271 P. 3 1 , 33 (Utah 1928)). Unless it does so,
the court's "'findings are insufficient to support a judgment.'" IdL However, the findings
need not resolve every possible factual dispute, so long as the court has adequately
resolved the "controlling issue in [the] case." JcL
The "controlling issue in this case" (Rucker. 598 P.2d at 1339) is whether or not
there was a contract. App. Br. 2 (Issue 5). The trial court found that there was "no
meeting of the minds." R. 1588.

As a result, whether or not Gephart had apparent

authority to bind GenBio without board action is not a "'material issue[]/" id. Indeed,
because the trial court's factual finding that there was no contract is not clearly erroneous,
no other findings are necessary "'to support [its] judgment.'" kL That judgment should
be affirmed. Paul v. Kunz. 524 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Ind. App. 2d Dist. 1988) ("a reviewing
court indulges every reasonable presumption in favor" of sustaining the trial court's
judgment).
EL

Appellants Are Estopped From Raising The Alleged Inconsistency As
Grounds For Remand

Even if the asserted inconsistency was material to the ultimate judgment, it would
not warrant remand. Appellants expressly assured the trial court that its counterclaim
rulings were consistent with its prior rulings and went to issues other than apparent
authority.

They are, therefore, estopped from now arguing "inconsistency" to obtain

remand.
A litigant may be estopped "because of the conduct or action of [that litigant] in
court." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 117 (1964). Indeed (id* at 610-611):
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it is generally recognized that a party who has knowingly and deliberately
assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings is estopped to assume a
position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party.
Accordingly, it has frequently been stated that where a party assumes a
certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that
position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,
assume a position to the contrary. . . .
Accord Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.. 829 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah App. 1992)
(appellee "cannot now be heard to argue" a factual position "contrary to all that has gone
before in the lengthy history of this case").53
GenBio objected to the proposed counterclaim findings of fact drafted by Appellants
because those findings were arguably inconsistent with the court's prior rulings on
Gephart's apparent authority.54 When faced this objection, Appellants responded that
their proposed findings had "nothing to do with Plaintiffs' alter ego re.a., apparent
authority] argument." R. 1532. Instead, Appellants repeatedly assured the trial court that
the proposed rulings went only to the "breach of fiduciary duty claims." Id.55 The trial
court, thus assured, issued the rulings now invoked by Appellants.
Appellants should be "estopped from playing 'fast and loose' with the court or
blowing 'hot and cold' during the course of litigation." Rosa v. C.W.J. Contractors, Ltd.,
664 P.2d 745, 751 (Haw. App. 1983) (quoting Godov v. Hawaii County. 354 P.2d 78
(1960)). They should not be permitted to obtain a remand on the basis of an inconsistency

See also Rosa v. C.W.J. Contractors, Ltd., 664 P.2d 745, 751 (Haw. App. 1983) ("A party will not
be permitted to maintain inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly
contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable
with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by his action").
54

EJL/ R- 1406, 1407 (GenBio argued that, because the court had previously held "that there was no
domination and control of GenBio by Ventana," the proposed counterclaim findings "contradict!] the court's
ruling that . . . Ventana and Mr. Gephart did not improperly control GenBio").
As opposing counsel represented to the trial court, "[t]he exercise of control over GenBio by Mr.
Gephart and Mr. Townsen . . . disproves the Defendants' counterclaim that the Plaintiffs attempted to divert
to themselves a corporate opportunity. . . . Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen were well aware of all
opportunities which were available to GenBio . . . but consciously chose not to pursue any of the
opportunities for the MRC Division." R. 1533. See also R. 1530-42 ("Plaintiffs' Response To Defendants'
Objection To Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law") (asserting repeatedly that the
proposed findings go not to apparent authority but, rather, whether Gephart and Townsen had such influence
over GenBio that Condie and Yarter could not breach their fiduciary duties or usurp a corporate opportunity).
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which they "have consistently argued throughout the course of this litigation" does not
exist. HHi, 829 P.2d at 148. They cannot tell the trial court that its rulings are consistent
and then obtain reversal by asserting the contrary. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 17(a) (1964) (the
rule of judicial estoppel is not "strictly one of estoppel, but partakes rather of positive rules
of procedure based on manifest justice and, to a greater or lesser degree, on considerations
of the orderliness, regularity, and expedition of litigation").
C

The Trial Court's Findings, In Anv Event, Are Not Inconsistent

The trial court's findings, finally, are not inconsistent. As Appellants themselves
note (App. Br. 33), remand is required only where the purportedly "inconsistent conclusions
[of the trial court] are irreconcilable." Paul v. Kunz. 524 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Ind. App.
1988). The findings on the counterclaim are completely reconcilable and consistent with
the trial court's findings on the complaint.
The trial court found that, while Gephart and Townsen "exercised a great deal of
control over the GenBio Board," none of this control rose "to the level of being a violation
of law." R. 1593. And, despite Appellants' claims to the contrary (App. Br. 33-36), none
of the trial court's counterclaim findings contradict the court's earlier detailed findings that
neither Gephart nor Townsen had apparent authority to act without board approval. R.
1587-88. Apparent authority, of course, could only be conferred by the acts or conduct
of GenBio in allowing Gephart or Townsen to make corporate decisions without board
ratification or approval.56 Not one of the trial court's counterclaim findings, however,
establishes that GenBio ever made an important corporate decision without board
action.57
Thus, the findings challenged by Appellants - far from being "irreconcilable" (Paul,
524 N.E.2d at 1329) - are completely consistent with the trial court's finding that GenBio

Zions First Nat'l Bank. 762 P.2d at 1095.
Indeed, in Finding 34 - cited by Appellants as "inconsistent" with the court's prior apparent authority
ruling (App. Br. 35-36) - the trial court merely noted that approval for the proposed sale in November 1989
was sought from Gephart and Townsen "prior to ... going to the board of directors for approval* R. 1597
(emphasis added).
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did not "giv[e] Mr. Gephart apparent authority." R. 1587. The Court need not remand this
matter for clarification.
V.

CONDIE AND YARTER BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO GENBlO BY SECRETLY
ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE THE IFA ASSETS

Yarter testified at trial that he didn't understand what "self dealing" or "conflict of
interest" meant. June 2 Tr. 149-50.

His actions - like those of Condie - in secretly

conspiring to acquire GenBio's only profitable assets, in suing the corporation when that
plot did not succeed, and in unabashedly pursuing this meritless appeal at great expense
to his former corporate mentor demonstrate unequivocally the truth of that testimony. This
Court should insure that Yarter and Condie both acquire, however belatedly, some
comprehension of those terms.
A±

Condie And Yarter Breached Their Duty Of Lovaltv

Corporate officers are fiduciaries. Pond v. Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 236
Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (Utah App. 1994); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d
636, 639 (Utah 1980); Elaaren v. Woollev, 228 P. 906, 909 (1924). That status imposes
strict obligations. In addition to a duty of due care,
Utah clearly recognizes the duty of loyalty. It requires a director, among other
things, to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation, and
prohibits directors from engaging in self-dealing.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess. 820 F.Supp 1359, 1365 (D. Utah 1993) (cites omitted)
(quoting Nicholson v. Evans. 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982)). And, contrary to the trial
court's finding, actual acquisition of a corporate opportunity is not the only means by which
this duty of loyalty can be breached. "Engaging in self-dealing" -- as well as the actual
consummation of tainted transactions - is prohibited.

Resolution Trust Corp.. supra

(emphasis added).
"A fiduciary duty carries with it an obligation to deal fairly and openly with those to
whom the duty is owed." Lochhead v. Alacano. 662 F. Supp. 230, 232 (D. Utah 1987)
(citing Nash v. Craiaco. Inc.. 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978)). As a result,
Any action on the part of directors looking to the impairment of corporate
rights, the sacrifice of corporate interests, the retardation of the objects of the
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corporation, and more especially the destruction of the corporation itself, will
be regarded as a flagrant breach of trust on the part of the directors engaged
therein.
Nicholson v. Evans. 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) (quoting 2 Thompson on
Corporations, 1327) (emphasis added).
The record amply demonstrates that Condie and Yarter did not deal fairly and openly
with GenBio but, rather, engaged in actions to impair corporate rights, sacrifice corporate
interests, and retard the objects of the corporation regardless of the destructive impact of
their efforts. And, while they were ultimately unsuccessful in their attempt to abscond
with GenBio's only profitable assets, that merely mitigates - but does not excuse - the
harm these former fiduciaries imposed. Cf. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d
130, 139 (Utah App. 1992) (insurer's eventual payment of a claim merely mitigates
damages flowing from its prior wrongful refusal to pay).
Within a month after the GenBio board first considered selling the IFA facility, Condie
and Yarter began planning to acquire those assets. June 7 Tr. 39. Their interest in this
"good little company" QdJ intensified in May 1990 (June 2 Tr. 155) because IFA
operations were twice as profitable as anyone had anticipated. June 7 Tr. 130. Condie's
discussions with GenBio employees — undertaken without informing either the employees
or GenBio of his interest - indicated that the desired assets could garner as much as $4.2
million in a single year. D. Exh. 15. As a result, Condie and Yarter attempted to obtain
financing (June 2 Tr. 132, 160-61; D. Exh. 14), and began gathering extensive -- and
specially prepared - financial data on the IFA operation. D. Exhs. 22, 24, 26.
These efforts, moreover, were hardly undertaken "in passing." App. Br. 6. On the
contrary, they included "research on new products that [they could] bring into the
company" (June 3 Tr. 197) and possible means of increasing the profitability of the
operation. In May, Condie proposed a "move to a single facility" to reduce costs and
increase efficiency (D. Exh. 12), and throughout the spring and summer of 1990 Condie
and Yarter did everything within their power to effectuate such a move. June 9 Tr. 15154; D. Exhs. 27, 28. Yarter himself set a "timetable" for the efforts: "Move before end of
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year." D. Exh. 23. Why the rush? Because it was at the end of the year - following their
resignations from the board - that Condie and Yarter planned to make their purchase offer.
All of Appellants' efforts from December 1989 through December 1990, furthermore,
were undertaken in secret. June 2 Tr. 167, 170-72; June 3 Tr. 194-95. In fact, when
GenBio's corporate secretary became suspicious of Yarter's efforts and asked whether he
was planning to purchase the IFA assets, Yarter tartly responded that it was "none of her
business." June 2 Tr. 126-27. And, in a very real sense, Yarter was right. The plans he
and Condie were making did not involve the "business" of GenBio. Those plans, instead,
were unmistakably and unequivocally their own.
The foregoing is hardly descriptive of fiduciaries acting "in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation." Resolution Trust Corp. 820 F. Supp at 1365. It is hardly the
picture of fiduciaries using "their ingenuity, influence, and energy . . . to preserve and
enhance the property and earning power of the corporation, even if . . . in conflict with
their own personal interests." Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730. These are not the actions of
fiduciaries dealing "fairly and openly with those to whom the duty is owed." Lochhead.
662 F. Supp. at 232. They are, instead, indicative of "a flagrant breach of trust on the part
of the directors engaged therein." Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730.
fi*

Condie And Yarter Breached Their Obligation Of Good Faith And Fair
Dealing

"In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all,
contractual relationships." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d
194, 199 (Utah 1991).

As a result of his contract with the corporation, a corporate

director is "bound by the same rules of good faith, full disclosure, and fair dealing as
surrounds the trustee in dealing with the cestui que trust." Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park
Galena Mining Co.. 296 P. 231, 240 (Utah 1931). Condie and Yarter have breached their
contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing.
Good faith performance requires that "a party's actions . . . be consistent with the
agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St. Benedict's
Dev. Co.. 811 P.2d at 200. Among the "justified expectations" (MJ of a corporation are
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that Its directors will "'exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions touching their
duties to the corporation and its property.... All their acts must be for the benefit of the
corporation and not for their own benefit."1 Glen Allen Mining, 296 P.2d at 240 (quoting
4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272). Condie's and Yarter's actions from the inception of their
purchase plans through the filing of this appeal hardly demonstrate utmost good faith in all
transactions with GenBio.
GenBio will not recite, again, the litany of Appellants' misdeeds. It suffices to note
that their actions were not undertaken for the benefit of GenBio.

Rather, Appellants

unequivocally sought to profit at GenBio's expense. The "course of dealings between and
conduct of the parties" unmistakably reveals a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. St. Benedict's Dev. Co.. 811 P.2d at 200.
£L.

Appellants Are Not Excused Because Their Purchase Plans Ultimately
Failed

The Appellants' various breaches should not be excused simply because their
purchase offer was ultimately unsuccessful. The court concluded that, because the GenBio
board rejected Appellants' offer, "there really was no breach . . . of fiduciary duty." June
10 Tr. 54. Appellants, for their part, asserted that, because their efforts failed, "there's
been no damage." June 9 Tr. 209. These submissions are erroneous. There has been a
breach and the resulting damage has been severe.
The trial court's "no breach" conclusion is premised on two arguments proffered by
Appellants: (a) that there was no harm done GenBio because their offer was unsuccessful
(June 9 Tr. 209) and (b) that Gephart and Townsen had such influence in GenBio's affairs
that Appellants were simply unable to injure the corporation or usurp a corporate
opportunity. See generally R. 1532-33; App. Br. 19-21, 33-36 (quoting R. 1592-97). The
trial court erred in adopting this reasoning. Indeed, these twin contentions are rather like
arguing that someone charged with attempted rape must be acquitted because (a) although
he tried, he didn't actually penetrate his victim, and (b) interested bystanders would have
stopped him in any event.
Just as criminal law reaches attempted rapists, agency law reaches fiduciaries who
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attempt mortal injury to their principals: "[t]he essence of the wrong [is] in the acquiring
of information while the relation of confidence existed, terminating the relation and
immediately thereafter using the information so acquired against the interest of [the
corporation]." Glen Allen Mining Co., 296 P. at 240. And, Appellants' claim that Gephart
and Townsen had enough influence to stop them in their tracks (R. 1592-97) hardly
excuses their actions in "looking to the impairment of corporate rights, the sacrifice of
corporate interests, [and] the retardation of the objects of the corporation." Nicholson, 642
P.2d at 730.
There can be little doubt, therefore, that Appellants have breached their fiduciary
obligations. It is also clear that Appellants' breach has imposed significant harm upon
GenBio. Indeed, the harm wrought by Appellants is, in a very real sense, unprecedented.
GenBio is unaware of any other reported case where directors of a publicly held
corporation have secretly plotted to acquire the corporation's only profitable assets and
then, when the conspiracy failed, brashly filed federal and state court litigation to compel
the corporation to fork over its financial mainstay. As a result of this effrontery, GenBio
has been forced to expend over $164,895 in attorneys' fees in federal and state trial courts
(June 9 Tr. 201) and thousands more in preparing papers in this Court. These damages
are properly recoverable, and should have been awarded, by the trial court. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Energy Mutual Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1991) (citing authority)
(attorneys' fees properly awarded as a foreseeable consequence of a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
Condie and Yarter, in November 1989 and continuing to this very day, owe fiduciary
duties to GenBio. As a result,
In all their official actions they are to consider, not their private interests, but
that of the [corporation], whose property they manage and control. This rule
is so strict and so rigidly enforced that the law will not permit these officials
to subject themselves to any temptations to serve their own interest in
preference to the interest of the [corporation].
Elaaren v. Woolley, 228 P. 906, 909 (Utah 1924) (emphasis added). Condie and Yarter
not only submitted themselves to "temptations to serve their own interest in preference to
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the interest of" GenBio, they succumbed. \JL The trial court's failure to sanction that
default should be reversed.
VI.

GENBIO IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF
APPELLANTS' FRIVOLOUS APPEAL

"An appeal must be well grounded in fact or law."

Backstrom Family Ltd.

Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, Rule 33(a),
Utah R. App. P., provides:
if the court determines that a motion or appeal . . is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs
. . . and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.
This appeal is not well grounded in fact or law and is, therefore, sanctionable.
GenBio does not make a claim for sanctions lightly. It is well aware that "sanctions
for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d
365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). This is, however, an egregious case. "Egregious cases may
include those obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and which
result in the delay of a proper judgment." Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah
App. 1989). These criteria are amply satisfied.
The appeal is obviously without merit. The trial court held that there was "no
meeting of the minds."

R. 1588. Appellants knew that this finding would be reviewed

under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52, Utah R. Civ. P. See R. 587 (Appellants
inform trial court that "intent to form a contract is a factual issue") (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, they completely and utterly failed to marshal the evidence in mounting their
appeal, thereby constraining GenBio "to do [their] work . . . at considerable time and
expense." Oneida/SLIC. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.
Even cursory review of the evidence marshaled by GenBio, moreover, demonstrates
that the trial court's finding -- far from being clearly erroneous -- is clearly correct. In these
circumstances, double costs and attorneys' fees are appropriate. As this Court reasoned
in Fife v. Fife. 777 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 1989):
Because it is obvious from the record that the trial court's findings were not
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clearly erroneous, we are convinced that [the] appeal is frivolous. In such
circumstances, Rule 33(a) of this court requires that we award attorneys fees
in a reasonable amount to the respondent.
Appellants, furthermore, have done more than merely shirk their duty to demonstrate
clear error. They have played "fast and loose" with the Court. Rosa, 664 P.2d at 751.
Their Statement - with a single exception (App. Br. 7) - is devoid of citations to the
transcript. But see Rule 24(a)(7), Utah R. App. P. Not only have Appellants ignored the
proceedings below, they have made claims that are flatly contradicted by the evidence.68
And, when all else has failed, they have argued that the trial court should be reversed
because its findings on the counterclaim "are completely inconsistent" with its findings on
apparent authority (App. Br. 31) - even though they fervidly assured the trial court that its
counterclaim findings had "nothing to do with Plaintiffs' alter ego [e.g.. apparent authority]
argument." R. 1532.
This case, in short, is a compelling example of a frivolous appeal: "'[o]ne in which
no justiciable question has been presented and [the] appeal is readily recognizable as devoid
of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed.'" Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d
414, 416 (Utah 1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979)). "The decision
to appeal should be reached only after careful consideration by counsel and client."
Backstrom. 751 P.2d at 1160. The Appellants' knowing failure to (1) acknowledge the
factual nature of their claim, (2) marshal the evidence, and (3) ground their arguments in
the record (Rule 24(a)(7), Utah R. App. P.) plainly demonstrate that neither counsel nor
Appellants gave this appeal "careful consideration." Backstrom. 751 P.2d at 1160.
"Since a valid professional evaluation would reveal a complete lack of merit. . . and
because of the otherwise unprofessional presentation of this case on appeal," Appellants

See, among others, Appellants' claims that Ventana controls "a super-majority of the stock of GenBio"
(App. Br. 4) when Appellants stipulated to the contrary (June 7 Tr. 52), that there is "no evidence" to
contradict Yarter's "cash offer" testimony (App. Br. 15) when Yarter contradicted himself (June 2 Tr. 182,
201), and that there were "many actions" taken by Gephart without board approval (App. Br. 5) when there
were none. Note 3 1 , above. See also Note 37 (Appellants claim IFA assets not "worth buying at any price"
despite the fact that their own evidence showed that, even without the IFA technology, the assets were
worth $100,000 more than the sum they offered) §n£ Note 56 (Appellants claim Gephart hired Gordy when
board minutes reflect the action was board-approved).

49

and their counsel are subject to sanction. Hunt, 785 P.2d at 417. Basic "fairness requires
that they bear the costs" - including GenBio's attorneys' fees ~ necessitated by their
frivolous action. Oneida/SUC. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. The case should be remanded
to the trial court for the calculation of that sum. Fife, 777 P.2d at 514.
CONCLUSION

The factual finding that there was "no meeting of the minds" is not clearly erroneous
and must be affirmed. R. 1588. The conclusion that Appellants did not breach their
fiduciary duties should be reversed and the case remanded for calculation of the legal fees
incurred by GenBio as a result of Appellants' breach of (among others) the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Appellants, in any event, should be required to bear the
expense associated with their frivolous appeal, including double costs and GenBio's
attorneys' fees. Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P.
Respectfully submitted this
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